House Hearing on Trump Assasination Attempt

Mike Kelly (00:00):

… Is doing to address it and most importantly, what other changes may be necessary? So the three goals to start off with, number one, to understand what went wrong on the day of the attempted assassination, we're talking about July 13th in Butler, Pennsylvania, to ensure accountability and to prevent such an agency failure from ever happening again. That is a tough task, because we don't know what the future holds for us. On July 13th in Butler, Pennsylvania, and then again on September 15th in West Palm Beach, Florida, President-elect Trump was the subject of two separate assassination attempts. Butler, Pennsylvania is not only within the district I represent, but it's also my hometown, where I grew up and have fond memories of playing American Legion Baseball on those grounds. I attended the July 13th rally with my family, my wife, one of my sons, and three of our grandchildren. The assassination attempt of President-elect that day has left its mark on our community and those that were in attendance that day. We lost Corey Comperatore, a volunteer firefighter who was dearly missed by many. His wife, his two daughters woke up that day with the excitement of being able to travel to Butler, which is only a few miles away from their hometown, to experience an event that they really were looking forward to. Four people were in that car that morning. That night, only three were in the car. Mr. Comperatore died. Our local law enforcement agency were wrongly smeared in the media for helping with the rally security. The Secret Service Zero Mission failed on July 13th and more trust in our federal agencies was lost, but the news is not all bad. After the departure of Secret Services former director Kimberly Cheatle, new leadership has taken responsibility for failures, Director Rowe thank you, and has been called out the complacency in the agency, choosing a path of cooperation. In pursuit of the truth, the Secret Service made every single employee this task force requested available for interview.

(01:55)
The Secret Services own mission accountability review is a credible self-critique and substantially consistent with the findings of the task force. When tested again, with a second assassination attempt in West Palm Beach, Florida on September 15th, the Secret Service security redundancies while not flawless, got the job done and kept President-elect a safe distance from harm. On October 5th, President-elect Trump returned to the stage in Butler, Pennsylvania with members of his own family. The differences between the planning, coordination, and execution of this event compared to July 13th were like the difference between day and night. The task force upcoming report includes a few dozen recommendations for Secret Service and its parent agency, the Department of Homeland Security, as well as Congress. In less than five months, the task force has conducted 46 transcribed interviews with local, state, and federal officials. Participated in over a dozen briefings with relevant agencies. Reviewed approximately 20,000 pages of documents, visited the site of July 13th assassination attempt in my hometown of Butler, and the site of the September 15th assassination attempt in West Palm Beach, Florida.

(03:09)
It also went to FBI laboratories in Quantico, Virginia to examine the physical evidence from the July 13th attempt. This work has positioned the task force to make bipartisan determinations about exactly how the failures occurred and where the responsibility lies. At the task force hearing on September 1st, it noted three key areas of failure by Secret Service that occurred on July 13th. This included planning errors that led to confusion among local law enforcement partners and inexplicable failure to close public access to the site where the shooter, Thomas Crooks, chose to position himself. And third, a communications and command structure that did not facilitate rapid communication. Further investigation has revealed new information shedding light on each of these failures. First, planning areas by Secret Service not only created confusion among local law enforcement partners, but also among the Secret Service agents working at the rally. In interviews with the task force, multiple agents offered uncertain and at times conflicting takes on what the duties of Secret Service personnel working in key roles for planning and execution the day the rally took place.

(04:22)
Second, our investigation found that AGR Complex, the grounds in buildings adjacent to the rally site, where the would-be assassin Thomas Crooks fired from, were not secured due to the Secret Service failure to understand and confirm key information. Interviews with Secret Service agents revealed the area was never secured, because agents mistakenly believed that state and local officials planned to secure it. Secret Service never verified this charge before or during the rally. Third, communications, and I think this is really the most important. Communications and intelligence failures occurred in numerous ways, ranging from a flawed setup, agents failing to speak up about problems they observed, training issues, inadequate resources, and not having the ability to communicate with one another in the moment of the crisis. After much investigation, we found no evidence or testimony suggesting that any Secret Service in proximity to President Trump at the rally, who might have been in the position to get him off the stage, knew that there was a suspicious or armed person on a rooftop until after shots were fired.

(05:31)
In the course of our investigation, some interviews with Secret Service personnel included expressions of regret, while others took defiant stances blaming colleagues for their failures. Several Secret Service agents interviewed by the task force have either already left the agency or have been placed on a status called situational telework, where they are not allowed to contribute to the core duty of protection. Those agents have been left in flux, waiting to if these fundamental leadership failures will ultimately lead to the end of their careers. It's not in our nation's or anyone's interest for the Secret Service to delay accountability decisions any longer. I strongly encourage Director Rowe to review the task force final report and act to hold those individuals responsible for the failure accountable in a way that enables the Secret Service to move forward. We are no longer under the illusion that there is still work to do in fixing these problems with the Secret Service.

(06:25)
Every four years, those campaigning for our nation's highest office reach out across America to connect with the public and ask for their support. This is a fundamental principle of our democracy. On top of being responsible for protecting our nation's highest ranking officials, their families, and foreign dignitaries during a campaign season, the Secret Service must protect the candidates running for office. This greatly increases their optional tempo and pushes the resources to a limit. Today we will discuss the lessons learned from this past campaign cycle and underscore what needs to happen moving forward. I want to thank Acting Director Rowe for being here today. And now, I yield to ranking member Crow for his opening comments.

Jason Crow (07:08):

Good morning. I would like to thank the Chairman and the members of this task force, and perhaps most importantly that the bipartisan staff for their incredible hard work over the last five months. I would also like to thank Acting Director Rowe for joining us here today for this important hearing. Political violence has no place in this country, and that is why the bipartisan work of this task force has been so critical. On July 24th, just days after the attempt on Donald Trump's life, the House of Representatives unanimously passed the resolution establishing this task force. Our mandate has been to investigate the facts and circumstances leading up to the assassination attempts in Butler, Pennsylvania and West Palm Beach, Florida, to understand how these attacks happened and how to prevent a similar incident from ever happening again. But we also had another mandate, another unofficial mandate, and that was to come together as Democrats and Republicans, and to show the nation that we can undertake the work of conducting an investigation of uncovering the truth and submitting a bipartisan report, telling that story. And that is what we have done.

(08:21)
In less than five months, the task force has done an outstanding amount of work to accomplish its mission. We received numerous briefings with federal agencies, including the Secret Service, the FBI and ATF; visited the site of the first assassination attempt in Butler, Pennsylvania, and the site of the second attempt in West Palm Beach, Florida; held 46 transcribed interviews with federal, state, and local law enforcement officials; reviewed more than 18,000 pages of documents in response to requests for information to federal, state, and local law enforcement agencies; published an initial interim report, laying out the task force's initial findings to ensure the American people remained updated on our work; held a public hearing with local and state law enforcement officials, and former Secret Service agent who provided additional understanding of what went wrong in Butler. We visited the FBI laboratory in Quantico, Virginia to review evidence from July 13th, and today we are holding our final hearing with Secret Service Acting Director Rowe, which will be immediately followed by a business meeting to approve our final report.

(09:25)
Although we received more cooperation from some federal agencies than others, we have been able to firmly establish the facts leading up to and on the days of both assassination attempts, and to make recommendations that will help prevent a tragedy like the one in Butler from happening again. We have also critically worked in an overwhelmingly bipartisan manner to ensure that the American people have the answers they deserve. I'm proud of this process and the work that we have done. Again, I would like to thank the members of this task force for their diligence, cooperation, and dedication to stopping political violence in the United States in its tracks. I look forward to a productive conversation today with Acting Director Rowe about what the Secret Service and Congress can continue to do to protect our nation's most senior leaders. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back.

Mike Kelly (10:17):

Thank you, Mr. Crow. I do, I want to just take a moment before we ask the director to swear in. I think when we look at what we were able to do, 13 members of Congress, right? Seven Republicans and six Democrats, we never identified as what our politics were about or what party we belonged to, what we identified as a group that was going to try to find, to get the answers to restore the faith and trust and confidence that the American people have to have. Not only in this institution, but us. And the other thing is, you've already mentioned it, 30 staff members have worked tirelessly since that creation. And while we weren't able to be here, because we're in primaries and we're in general elections, and we're running all over the country, they never left. They stayed and they did all the work.

(11:01)
So I can't tell you how proud I am of this group. They're the ones that should get all the credit. We get the chance to sit here, we'll take the blame, but I think I'd rather take the blame and give others the credit for the success. So let's go ahead and move forward, but I want to thank the staff, everybody that's here today. You guys did one heck of a job. Thank you for your dedication. Now we're going to introduce our witness. Today we are joined by Mr. Ronald L. Rowe Jr. Acting Director US Secret Service. Director, we appreciate you being here today. Now, will you please stand and raise your right hand? Do you solemnly swear or affirm that the testimony that you are about to give is the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God? Let the record show that the witness answered in the affirmative. I now recognize Mr. Rowe for his five-minute opening remarks. Director, I think we've talked about this. We're going to be flexible on the time.

Ronald L. Rowe Jr. (11:57):

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Good morning, Chairman Kelly, Ranking Member Crow, distinguished members of the task force. I appreciate the efforts of this task force and I thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today. July 13th was a failure of the Secret Service to adequately secure the Butler Farm Show site and protect President-elect Trump. That abject failure underscored critical gaps in Secret Service operations and I recognize that we did not meet the expectations of the American public, Congress and our protectees, and they rightly have that idea based on how we performed. President-elect Trump was wounded. A cowardly and despicable act killed one person and critically injured two others. And I join you and all Americans in condemning the horrific assault on President-elect Trump, Corey Comperatore, James Copenhaver and David Dutch, and I extend my deepest sympathies to the Comperatore family. Since becoming Acting Director, I've worked tirelessly to address what I believe are shared goals with the task force to understand what went wrong on the day of the attempted assassination, to ensure accountability, to prevent such a failure from ever happening again.

(13:28)
The recently completed Mission Assurance inquiry thoroughly investigated the specific actions and inactions that led to the assassination attempt. Four areas of deficiencies were identified. Communications, protective advanced processes, command and control processes, and coordination with external entities. The Mission Assurance inquiry identified failures by multiple employees that warrant disciplinary action. The quality of the advanced work and preparation for the Butler Farm Show visit absolutely did not meet the expected standards of this agency. Let me be clear. There will be accountability and that accountability is occurring. It is an extensive review that requires time to ensure due process, and the pace of this process, quite frankly, it does frustrate me, but it is essential that we recognize the gravity of our failure. I personally carry the weight of knowing that we almost lost a protectee and our failure cost a father and husband his life.

(14:45)
I have reflected extensively on the agency's substandard performance during the advance for the Butler Rally. I have implemented numerous systemic and strategic changes to prevent these failures from ever happening again. It has been my singular focus to bring much-needed reform to the Secret Service, to be an agent of change, to challenge previous assumptions, and while doing so, also ensuring that the brave men and women of the Secret Service have the resources, leadership, and assets that they need to be successful in carrying out our protective mission. A full list of actions is itemized to my prepared testimony, but these changes have included providing the highest levels of Secret Service protection to President-elect Trump throughout the remainder of the Presidential campaign. Expanding the use of unmanned aerial systems for aerial observation at venues, expanding the use of counter unmanned aerial systems technologies to mitigate the use of a UAS as a kinetic attack vector.

(15:50)
Expanding the use of ballistic countermeasures at Secret Service protected campaign sites, a directive to mandate unified command in a singular location for all protective sites, something that was not done on July 13th in Butler. We are operating in a heightened threat environment with expanding protection requirements, and this requires a shift in the Secret Service's levels of protection, readiness, and sustainability. The paradigm shift focuses on elevating protection, prioritizing training, strengthening our workforce, and increasing accountability. The elevation of protective operations ties directly to how the work performed by special agents in the field directly relates to our protective mission. The field offices serve a critical role in everything we do operationally to include protection, protective intelligence investigations, and enforcement operations, among many other important responsibilities. Recognizing how operationally integrated that field offices are, I'm directing an organizational change to shift the Office of Investigations to the Office of Field Operations.

(17:04)
This is not simply a semantic change. Establishing the Office of field operations is an opportunity to reset our thinking and perspective about the role field offices play in protection, and to enhance our operational effectiveness by better leveraging field offices to support, enable and inform protection and protective activities. It is also my intention to reconstitute the Secret Service's culture, such that training is routine and expected. That was how it was done when I was operational on the Presidential Protective Division. And somehow along the way, we became disproportionately operational in comparison to time allocated for training.

(17:47)
As I have publicly stated, the Secret Service historically has had to manage its operations by doing more with less. That is not consistent with achieving a no fail mission. And since becoming Acting Director, I've made it my priority to eliminate the Do More with Less mindset, which has had a long-term degrading effect on our workforce and our protective operations. The Secret Service is making progress on this, thanks to Congress. The continuing resolution, which was passed in September, appropriated additional funding to the Secret Service in FY 2025, to support immediate requirements associated with protective operations. I greatly appreciate the efforts of Congress and numerous staff members in making that supplemental a reality.

(18:36)
The world is a dangerous place. The responsibilities of the Secret Service are critical to the national security of the United States. It is important that decision-makers fully recognize and appreciate the vital role and significance of the Secret Service in our nation's security. The terrorist, the nation state actor, the sniper, the lone gunman, the lone wolf gunman. They must be lucky once, but the men and women of the Secret Service must be perfect every time. That may not be fair, but that's the world in which we operate in. Thankfully, Congress has responded to the immediate challenges facing the Secret Service, and for that, we are grateful. Our agency is not defined by one failure, but by our ability to learn from mistakes, to hold ourselves accountable, then learn, evolve, and continue striving for excellence. After the failure of July 13th, the dedicated men and women of the Secret Service rose to the occasion.

(19:42)
In the face of immense pressure and adversity, they answered a call to duty with unwavering resolve, and I want to express my gratitude for the extraordinary dedication and hard work of our special agents, uniformed division officers, mission support personnel. They all persevered when the demands of the mission surpassed anything they or their families have ever been asked to take on. Their commitment to the mission, even under such challenging circumstances is nothing short of inspiring. I'm truly honored to serve alongside such a remarkable group of individuals. Mr. Chairman, I'll submit the remainder of my statement for the record and I look forward to answering the questions of this committee. Thank you.

Mike Kelly (20:29):

Thank you, Director Rowe. I'm now going to recognize myself for five minutes. First of all, I want to thank you for your testimony. Of all the areas that the Secret Service reviewed after July 13th, what do you think was the most concerning failure of that day looking back on it? And had you been the one developing the game plan, what different moves would you have made strategically to ensure that it was a safe and secure area?

Ronald L. Rowe Jr. (20:51):

So I think what is glaring to me is the failure to recognize the significance of the AGR building, to recognize the significance of proximity to what was perceived to be the middle perimeter of the site. The lack of recognizing that, the failure to effectively communicate, as you stated, and some of the findings of the task force, to effectively communicate to local law enforcement that we need to have uniform presence out here, that we shouldn't have people that close unscreened on the curtilage of our site, not having better line of sight mitigation, having something scrim along that fence line that was to the three o'clock, having uniform law enforcement presence out there, having special attention measures by those law enforcement officers.

(21:48)
That to me is glaring and those are basic tenets, fundamentals of what advance teams are supposed to identify. They are supposed to identify hazards, risks, and then mitigate those risks effectively, either by using law enforcement and coordinating assets, or taking matters and making sure that it is mitigated and that risk is taken out of play. We did not do that on the 13th. Post-July 13th, there was a renewed focus on that, making sure that supervisors were engaged, that we provided assets, that we had enabling UAS platforms in the air. That was the difference on October 5th, that you saw with your own eyes, sir.

Mike Kelly (22:36):

First of all, I want to thank you for your testimony. Of all the people that have weighed in on this, myself, my wife, three of my grandchildren and one of my sons were there. I was on the grounds both on July 13th and October 5th. I want to reiterate what I said earlier. The difference is the difference between day and night. And my concern was, from the day the site was selected, when it was turned over to Secret Service, somehow that exchange, for whatever reason, the ability to coordinate the efforts between local law enforcement and federal agencies just seemed to be casual. I don't think local law enforcement knew enough about what was expected of them. I think that that day they were doing what they thought they were supposed to do, and then afterwards it's like, "Well, we should have communicated better." And I've got to tell you, from the beginning, I always was trying to figure out why two different command centers, and why weren't the two command centers even able to communicate with each other?

(23:29)
Because at the end of the day, it's about communication. And as I've already said, we shouldn't have waited until 11 minutes after six that day to determine that we couldn't communicate. So going forward, you've already made some changes and I think when you look at October 5th, and to me when I walk on the grounds that day, I felt like I was in the safest place in the world. The awareness of that, when you look back at it, and you were not in charge at that time on July 13th, but afterwards, the attention to detail that you put into effect on October the fifth, if you can share what we should do going forward, as is there a protocol, is there an ability to communicate? Is there an ability then to draw not only the federal agencies in, but also local agency? Because you can't cover the whole thing by yourselves, you just don't have enough personnel, you don't have enough assets. Going forward, I know you've already initiated plans like that. Just share a few of those with us, please.

Ronald L. Rowe Jr. (24:22):

Sure. Actually, now we have done some organizational changes as well. I've created an aviation unit, so that's making sure that we're putting out those drones up in the sky to give us visibility. If we don't have a drone or if for whatever reason a state or local wants to fly a drone, we're going to allow them to fly that drone as well. The whole point is to get, and this is what we did not have on July 13th, and it's one common operating picture.

(24:51)
On October 5th, we knew exactly where every law enforcement officer was, because they were using a Blue Force Tracker. We have that same platform. So having that domain awareness now moving forward at our protected sites, that is a change that we are operationalizing. We did this as part of our paradigm shift. We have to look at the threat and what that threat is, and our security model is based on that threat, and we have to prepare every day that there is somebody out there who's there to do harm. And that means that we have to communicate that to our state and local officers, and they are just as much of a partner at the table when we are developing that plan.

Mike Kelly (25:33):

Okay, thank you. Listen, we could go on for a long time back and forth of what was there. I just will reiterate it. There is only one person on this panel, in this room, unless other people came down from Butler that was there that day. I was there that day. It was really messed up. I couldn't understand at all what was going on, because it was unlike any other rally that I'd ever attended. I do know that you have so many protectees that are out there. The size and scope of your responsibility is beyond what the average American would understand. And I think by having these hearings, people are going to understand what is the purpose of the investment, why do we do it, and who all is it we're trying to protect? At this time, I'm going to turn over to Mr. Crow. He's been wonderful working with him and his military background exceeds anything I ever knew. So Representative Crow, please.

Jason Crow (26:18):

Thank you, Chairman. Acting Director, I wanted to actually pick up on that last line of questioning about the lack of a common operational picture and your reference to a Blue Force Tracker. I mean, Blue Force Tracker is something that I used a lot when I was a ranger in the military, because what we know is that when you're operating in a complex environment and you have multiple levels of agencies, you have local, state, federal, DOD assets, folks who don't always necessarily train and work together, but they're thrown together for a task force or a specific mission, and they're sometimes operating across vast distances and different geography. That common operational picture, right? One place where all communications flow, where there's unified command, where everyone can see where everyone else is, they can share information in real time, that that is essential, right? In Afghanistan, for example, that's what we had.

(27:15)
We were oftentimes working with FBI, intelligence agencies, different countries across hundreds of kilometers in instances, but we had a platform, an actual physical platform that served as a virtual command post. So it doesn't matter where you were or who you were, you could look at that and see where everybody else was and share information. And it is just wild to me that in 2024, our nation's premier law enforcement agency on July 13th was using text messages on their personal cell phones, literally sending emails in some cases to deliver real-time information, and scribbling messages on paper and not using a system. So it's good to hear that you've implemented that in part on October 5th and going forward, but can you tell me, I mean, are you looking into more advanced systems and platforms that I know exist on the DOD side? I know DOD has these, are you looking into these? Are you developing this and can you commit today to pursuing and implementing that level of technology?

Ronald L. Rowe Jr. (28:20):

I will commit to that, ranking member, and we are actually looking at this. The whole basis of giving that domain awareness and superiority is exactly what you just described. And what is my experience as a national special security event coordinator. In 2016, I was a coordinator for the RNC in Cleveland. When the Secret Service goes into planning for a national special security event, we do this. We do exactly what it's called, a multi-agency coordinating center. We have an incident log, we have a Blue Force Tracker. We know where our partners are. We should be able to do this, and we can do this on a smaller scale. And so, I've taken entities, for example, our radio operations, I've taken them out of a line of business directorate and I've put them more closely aligned to an operational entity. And that same operational entity, our technical security division, they also handle our cameras, our sensors, our aviation.

(29:24)
So it's all about making sure that we're looking at things in DOD world, and we rely heavily on DOD for a lot of our overseas operations. And so, they are already down the road with a lot of stuff, and we are leveraging those partnerships and leveraging some of the other commercially available off the shelf stuff that's available right now, that is FedRAMP, that we can bring it inside our system. We are doing that work right now, and there's about two or three different systems that we're looking at right now, and one of them is a DOD system.

Jason Crow (29:58):

Thank you. The last question I wanted to address was this issue of culture. And I'm struck by the fact that there were numerous things that occurred on July 13th, and I'll just list some examples. One was the counter UAS operator did not have formal training on that system, and when it didn't operate, they just simply went without, without it being raised to anyone else's awareness. And the agent responsible for emplacing the counter sniper team, placed the team that had responsibility for the sector that included the AGR rooftop, which is where the gunman fired from, placed it in a location where there was a tree blocking substantial portions of that rooftop. Yet nobody said anything. When I was in the army, there was this culture and expectation that when you were on a mission or in a training range, that anybody could say something at any time if they saw a safety risk. It's the old adage, "If you see something, say something," right? So a private could stop a training mission

Jason Crow (31:00):

… mission or even a real mission if there was a life and safety issue. Commercial pilots have the same thing. That if you're in the cockpit, anybody can say there's a problem to the captain, or stop something from happening. I'm struck by the lack of that culture on July 13th. That if you're a counter sniper and you've been emplaced in a position that actually doesn't allow you to see entire sectors of the position that you're responsible for, why aren't people saying something? And it happened on numerous occasions. So can you speak to that culture and how you change that culture so that folks speak up and everybody's empowered to make necessary changes on the spot if they need to?

Ronald L. Rowe Jr. (31:45):

Sure. So first it starts with training a retraining, a re-education of folks. We have to do that. Secondly, we also have to make sure that we are more regularly doing hot washes after actions on this. So one of the organizational changes, I've directed the Office of Protective Operations to initiate and stand up almost an auditing capability. To regularly send out folks to evaluate how we're doing and also share findings with our office of training. What we don't want to do is we want people to understand, we want to get better. We're not here to take punitive action against people just to gig you for something. No, we want to make the mission better.

(32:32)
We want to do that. We do this again in our national special security event construct. It's in policy that that coordinator has to do an after action report. We do some of these things informally, but we have to do this regularly. We have to do after actions reports, and we have to retrain our folks to say it's okay to see something and say, hey, wait a minute. Why don't we have that hallway covered?

(32:58)
I will tell you that my time as a full-time agent on the president's detail, that was the culture. I don't know where we lost that, but you were always empowered. If there was 31 post-standers on that site, there were 31 different site agents and you had a shared collective responsibility. Exactly what you're talking about for the integrity of that site. We have to get back to that. And I think training, which touches everything from the cradle of your career all the way to the end of your career, training is where we need to make that investment.

Jason Crow (33:32):

Thank you. I couldn't agree more, and I appreciate that answer. I yield back.

Mike Kelly (33:37):

Thank you. We now recognize Representative Joyce from Ohio for five minutes of questions.

David Joyce (33:41):

Thank you, Chairman Kelly. And first I'd be remiss if I didn't thank you and Ranking Member Crow for the fair and honest way in which you've handled this matter. And to the distinguished colleagues I have here on this committee for their use of their background. Since my background seems to be in appropriations and I happen to have chaired the Homeland Security Appropriations Subcommittee in '24, I'm pretty familiar with your budget.

Ronald L. Rowe Jr. (34:07):

Yes, sir.

David Joyce (34:07):

And so I think I wanted to go down that lane with you. In the September CR, Congress approved $231 million in supplemental funding for the agency led up to the '24 election in November. Acting Director, can you describe specifically how that funding was used? How did you prioritize where to allocate it? And how those decisions will impact the longer-term resource needs of the agency?

Ronald L. Rowe Jr. (34:31):

Sure. So there were immediate needs that we used a portion of that money for. So we are submitting regular reports back to the Appropriations Committee. So they are closely tracking this. And we see this as an opportunity to prove that we can fiscally spend this money in a very responsible way.

(34:56)
Following July 13th, we made a request to the Department of Defense for increased air mobility support. That's a reimbursable agreement that we have with them. We increased our reimbursable agreements with other partner agencies to fill some personnel gaps that we had. Tactical operators from other agencies from across the department, other support when it came to counter UAS, support for screening with TSA. So as we brought up the president-elect and the vice president, we brought them up to the highest levels of Secret Service protection, same level as the president. And so we needed that money for additional reimbursable agreements, requests for assistance that we have with other agencies.

(35:44)
We've also started moving money out to acquire more materials that we needed as we started to put more assets out on the road. Classified assets, ballistic assets, now the wear and tear on that is going to increase. So now we have to make sure that we can acquire more and put more money down on contracts. So that as we are going to now go through the service life of these materials, we have to be able to replenish them and replenish them quickly. So some of these are long lead items. So that money has been very, very helpful to us in making sure that we can address our immediate needs.

David Joyce (36:23):

Great. Your written testimony for this hearing, you reference that "One of the practices after taking over the agency has been realigning agency technology programs with the appropriate operational entities across the Secret Service with the goal of effectively leveraging internal research and the development of emerging technologies." Director Rowe, could you provide additional detail on what has been included in that process and has the DHS been helpful to your agency in pursuing technological modernization efforts? Have you worked with the Science and Technology Directorate or any of the DHS components to evaluate available technologies already being used by the department or any recent developments in these emerging technologies?

Ronald L. Rowe Jr. (37:03):

Yes. Yes, we have Congressman. So S&T has been very helpful to us with our technical security. We actually use some of their money to do some sandbox testing of things that we're looking at.

(37:20)
Many, many years ago, we had an Office of Protective Research. And that office did a lot of R&D, did a lot of evaluation of things. There was a reorganization more than a decade ago, and that research element within the Secret Service kind of went away. It was ad hoc. We often relied on other partners, DOD, for example, to do a lot of research, DARPA and other entities. One of the things that I wanted to do was to create our own in-house ability to do applied research, so that we are working with other agencies formally like S&T, like DARPA, like others in the military that are operationalizing a lot of technologies.

(38:07)
And so, one of the things that we've done, and one of the things I'm trying to do is put the secret back in the Secret Service, but there's been media coverage of this, so I'll talk about it. Right now at Mar-a-Lago, we've started using a sensor array, an autonomous robot that's out there walking the seawall right now. It has a sensor package. We will use it at sites. We've started using it, and those are the types of technologies that have been out there. That have been in DOD world for years. We need to start leveraging those resources. And so the use of the autonomous canines down there right now, it's just one example of that.

David Joyce (38:49):

I'm glad to hear that. I was disheartened to hear some of the things that were brought up before about the failure of communication. I thought after 9-11 we cured that and we'd have uniform platforms and all law enforcement, especially the activities such as the ones that Secret Service are involved in or in communication all the time. So I'm glad to know that you're at least using these funds to try to progress the integrity of your communication system network-wide. Thank you. Yield back.

Mike Kelly (39:18):

Thank you, Mr. Joyce. Also, I recognize right now Representative Correa from California for five minutes.

Lou Correa (39:23):

Thank you, Mr. Chairman, I want to thank you and our Ranking Member Crow for having these important hearings today. And Director Rowe, I want to thank you for the good job you've done and the very limited time that you've had being where you're at.

(39:37)
I want to talk a little bit, sir, about culture, morale, and turnover. When you think about the Secret Service, you're talking about the elite, the best of the best. We've all watched those movies on TV. Secret Service agents take bullets for candidates. You're kind of the guardians of democracy. You make sure that it's the voters and not an assassin's bullet that determine the outcome of elections in this country. And yet we hear that agents are demoralized, overworked, exhausted. 2022/2023 largest turnover in decades in that Secret Service.

(40:21)
And today, 60% of your agents have less than 10 years experience. 30% of your agents have less than five years experience. You got a short runway here to get up and running. How can we make Secret Service officers proud again? Get their morale up again? All of us have heard about those crazy parties in Columbia and other places that are really not deserving of that Secret Service reputation. How do we turn that ship around sir?

Ronald L. Rowe Jr. (40:58):

Yes sir. So we actually have really turned the tide on our hiring. I will tell you, our applications are up. The one thing that-

Lou Correa (41:10):

I want to say that's not only your problem. Because we've stepped up given you $231 million and laid a CR. So what else can we do? How can we fix this?

Ronald L. Rowe Jr. (41:20):

Yeah. So we closed out FY24 on the plus side, first time for a net game. Over 200 agents, around 200 agents or so. We've increased our net and we've been able to hang on to our veteran agents. Part of that is by giving them a retention incentive, which we just rolled out now. We're able to-

Lou Correa (41:41):

When you say hold onto them, is that because people are, you got to retirements coming up or is it people just want to leave the agency?

Ronald L. Rowe Jr. (41:48):

I think part of it is the workload, right? And I think what will alleviate that workload is bringing more in.

Lou Correa (41:53):

Okay.

Ronald L. Rowe Jr. (41:54):

So right now we have about 500 agents in various states of training between now and March. We are going to onboard another 400 by June and we're going to onboard 200 uniform division officers by June. We are on pace right now to hire 650 special agents and 350 uniform division officers. So being able to retain the workforce that we have and bring on more, we're going to make steady gains. Because what I look at what we have ahead of us in '28, another presidential campaign, an incumbent who's not going to be out there who's not seeking office, but is probably going to be out there campaigning. It's going to be a tough year in '28. I need to ramp up.

Lou Correa (42:36):

The spirit decor. Are these new agents proud to be in the Secret Service? Do they know it's an honor to serve?

Ronald L. Rowe Jr. (42:44):

They do. When I speak with them prior to when they graduate, we have a very candid conversation and then I explain to them. Others-

Lou Correa (42:54):

So we're essentially bringing in more folks, reducing their workload, make sure they get plenty of sleep and they're on the job?

Ronald L. Rowe Jr. (43:02):

True. And we're also going after with a targeted recruitment. We're trying to get people from the military, from law enforcement, with specialized skills, special operations experience, and bringing them in and then having them join the ranks of our special operations division. So we're basically taking a multi-faceted approach to build our ranks. And those folks, when they join they're proud. That's one of the proudest days of their life when I hand them that commission book and badge. And I explain to them that they have an obligation, not for the people that they protect, but for also the people that came before them. That paved the way and the people that will come after them.

Lou Correa (43:44):

Director Rowe, I've got about a minute left.

Ronald L. Rowe Jr. (43:47):

Sure.

Lou Correa (43:48):

Last question for you. Same question I've asked before. Who's in charge? If you're in a place, a site where you're going to have a campaign rally and the Secret Service believes this is not a safe place, I don't get a good feeling about holding this rally here, and the campaign says "No, we're going to have the rally here." Who's in charge? Who wins that argument?

Ronald L. Rowe Jr. (44:15):

Listen, ultimately it is the Secret Service responsible for creating that safe environment.

Lou Correa (44:21):

That's not my question. If that environment is not completely safe, do you have veto power over the decision to hold that rally at that place?

Ronald L. Rowe Jr. (44:34):

We do. And we do have those conversations with staff.

Lou Correa (44:36):

So you can tell them you're not going to have the rally here, you got to move somewhere else.

Ronald L. Rowe Jr. (44:41):

We do that, yes.

Lou Correa (44:42):

I just want to make clear. So you can do that. You have that power.

Ronald L. Rowe Jr. (44:45):

We do. And it is a conversation. They have the same objective. They want to keep their protection-

Lou Correa (44:50):

That's not what I've heard before, but I will take your word for it now and we'll discuss it further later on.

Ronald L. Rowe Jr. (44:55):

Thank you, sir.

Lou Correa (44:55):

Mr. Chairman, I'm out of time. Thank you very much.

Mike Kelly (44:58):

Thank you, sir. Now I would recognize the gentleman from Louisiana, former sheriff, maybe still sheriff. The only member of law enforcement that sits on this panel, Mr. Higgins you're recognized for five minutes.

Clay Higgins (45:10):

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I was a captain in the sheriff's office, but I appreciate the promotion.

Speaker 1 (45:18):

The only one that adds on this committee.

Clay Higgins (45:22):

Mr. Director, I appreciate your responsiveness to my personal outreaches to you. In the months that we've looked into this, you have been accessible and you helped me with some ballistic investigations that I was working on, you helped me personally. And over the course of the last several months, I've come to have a high degree of confidence that you are very focused on making the necessary adjustments to culture and policy and technology capabilities within the Secret Service in order to mitigate against threat at a heightened level.

(46:13)
As we move deeper into the 21st century, I think you have stepped into a difficult chair at a time of incredible challenge and you've done so quite courageously and I say again, you've been very accessible. That's important to members of Congress because when we feel like we're closed out from the executives that we are efforting to work with and to provide appropriate oversight, we don't appreciate that. So you're to be commended, I believe good sir, for the character that you've shown and stepping into your chair at a difficult time and in the way interacted with Congress.

(47:06)
So you stated that we are "Living in a state of heightened threat." I agree. And I would ask you to compare that to how we balance that with freedom as it relates to the Secret Service's particular mission of protecting protectees or VIPs. We do not expect nor want to live in a prison state. Some of my colleagues mentioned to it, not completely safe. Let me say there's no such thing as completely safe. You have to mitigate against threat.

(47:51)
And you mentioned two levels of failure. I'm going to ask you to address one of them, which I concur with. You mentioned the AGR building proximity and communications failures. So I'm going to shift to communications failures on J-13 and ask you to address what you have done to respond to the failure to deliver local radios as provided by Butler County ESU set aside for the Secret Service that were never retrieved. You had isolated assets on rooftops that had no direct radio communication other than the delay of through their command post and their cell phones, but it would've been very easy for them to have a local radio up on a roof. That didn't happen. That cost seconds and impacted the results of the entire day. So what have you done to address that?

Ronald L. Rowe Jr. (48:59):

So we've implemented a PACE, a Primary Alternate Contingency and Emergency. And also making sure that, for example, the snipers, our counter snipers and local snipers are actually co-located. So that's to cut down on that, to make sure that they are standing next to each other so that there is clarity of communication between them. And then also if exchanging radios and making sure that we have their radio and can hear what they say in clear communications.

Clay Higgins (49:29):

Yes, sir. So sharing radios was part of your pre-mission plan for Butler on J-13. So the failure to execute the pre-mission plan is impacted us here. You actually had the planning in place, but it wasn't executed on that day. Reasonable man will see that as a failure of on-site leadership to follow through with the agreed to plan. How are you addressing that within the culture and the policies of the Secret Service to make certain that something like that does not happen again? And I'll yield the remainder of my time for your answer.

Ronald L. Rowe Jr. (50:16):

Sure. So the Office of Protective Operations and our Office of Field Operations now, that is something that they ensure that we have. That either shared incident command post and then where we have partners with special operations division entities that are supporting us, that there is somebody with us. And we either have their radio or they are with us and we are testing those communications in advance to make sure that they are rock-solid.

Clay Higgins (50:44):

Thank you for your clarification on that very important topic of radio communications. Good sir, I appreciate you being here. I yield Mr. Chairman.

Mike Kelly (50:55):

Thank you. We now recognize Representative Dean from Pennsylvania for five minutes of questions.

Lou Correa (50:59):

Mr. Chair, if I may, can I introduce some articles into the record at this time?

Mike Kelly (51:03):

Certainly.

Lou Correa (51:04):

First one, An Exodus of Agents Left the Secret Service Unprepared, New York Times. Second one, More High-ranking Officials and Secret Service Stepping Down, CNN. Acting Service Director Responds to Critical New Reports about Security Failures, NBC News. Agency in Crisis, NBC News. And final one, Secret Service Doubts Protection Improvements as Election Looms. Thank you.

Mike Kelly (51:31):

Without objection, so ordered. I now recognize Representative Dean from Pennsylvania for five minutes.

Madeleine Dean (51:38):

Thank you Chairman Kelly. And I want to personally thank you and Ranking Member Crow for how you have conducted this task force with the seriousness and the non-partisanship that you brought to it. I also do want to echo the thanks to the staff, the extraordinary work of this bipartisan staff over these many weeks and months. And I want to acknowledge that the tragedy that was July 13th.

(52:02)
I thank you Director Rowe and all of your talented agents for so seriously looking at what failed. And I appreciate that you used immediately in your testimony the words that "July 13th was a failure." It absolutely was. And I'm thankful to you for not trying to fog it over with some euphemism, some opacity that would not tell the American public what they need to know, what Congress needs to know in order to support the Secret Service to do your mission of no fail. So I thank you for that.

(52:36)
I want to talk as quickly as I can around advance pre-planning, then the day of and then line of sight and snipers. Counter sniper by Secret Service as well as local ESUs. So for example, at the last hearing I had the chance to talk with Butler Township Police Department Patrolman Drew Blasko. He testified that "During the July 11th walkthrough, he told three Secret Service agents from the Pittsburgh Field office and the Donald Trump detail that the AGR complex was a vulnerability." Some of the vulnerabilities he spoke about was the ability of people to get on the ground. I don't think he spoke specifically as to the roof. But the fence line, that chain link fence line over to the fairgrounds that it was see through frankly, and the opacity that the failure of making that opaque. There was I think some discussion of vehicles, put some vehicles along there, AG vehicles or something.

(53:39)
So my question is, I know that the Secret Service has testified that they don't remember those conversations. Did the Secret Service discuss the vulnerability with local police or anybody as to the AGR complex? That fence line? The property itself?

Ronald L. Rowe Jr. (53:57):

Congressman, what I can tell you is based on what my mission assurance inquiry has found is I cannot find a written communication where the AGR building was discussed. To me, that is glaring. That's a problem. It should have been identified. When I traveled there-

Madeleine Dean (54:17):

Excuse me, I'm testifying.

Ronald L. Rowe Jr. (54:19):

… a day after I was named as the Acting, and as I'm walking around, and when I went up on the roof and I'm looking at the proximity to the site, I was taken aback by the fact that that was not secured. So my answer to you is I don't have a written record of that.

Madeleine Dean (54:38):

And so in the future, would those kinds of vulnerabilities be written down? I mean, they can be verbal, but at some point somebody should be taking notes. And that leads me to my second set of questions, which is the day of. What happens when Secret Service comes to the site and they see these vulnerabilities? That transparent fence line? A property completely unprotected so the people could walk through, get closer to the stage to the President than those who had to wait in line to go through magnetometers. Who is in charge when you get on the property to say, we got a problem over here on the left-hand side?

Ronald L. Rowe Jr. (55:17):

Yes. So we are clarifying the policy about who is in charge. And the current policy states that the advanced team is responsible under the direction of the field office SAC. That's in policy that they are supposed to identify risks and mitigate them.

Madeleine Dean (55:38):

But is there sort of a tick-tock? Where you say, okay, we're on the property, we've got the president coming in and have we checked all the boxes in terms of the protection of this space?

Ronald L. Rowe Jr. (55:49):

As a good site agent, you should be there when the site is being built, things are being placed. And then if things are not where they should be or where you thought they should be, it should be escalated up to the Detailed Second Supervisor who arrives ahead of the protectee. There is a mechanism, it was not exercised in this situation.

Madeleine Dean (56:09):

Okay. And then I know my time's running out. Two quick things. The failure to coordinate with Butler and Beaver ESUs, the Emergency Services Units. One was up on a rooftop across the way, the other inside the AGR building. That's a baffling miscommunication to me, a failure of direction for them.

(56:33)
And I want to end with this, which is where I began. When Ranking Member Crow and Chairman Kelly separately called me about serving on this task force, I was struck by the final thing that the Chairman said to me in terms of our mission here. It is of course to identify the failures, to identify what Congress can do to strengthen the resources you need. But it is ultimately to make sure we can restore faith in institutions as essential as the Secret Service. So that is our ultimate mission here. And of course, to protect lives. The fact that we lost Mr. Comperatore, two others grievously injured, others traumatized. Unable to with joy, go participate in our political system without fear of violence against candidates, protectees or themselves. We have to restore faith in institutions like yours. And with that, I yield back.

Mike Kelly (57:29):

Thank you, Ms. Dean. And now I'm going to recognize the Chairman of Homeland Security, Representative Green for five minutes.

Mark Green (57:35):

Thank you, Chairman Kelly and I want to commend you and Ranking Member Crow and the task force staff for the hard work that they put into investigating this critical security failure that led to the assassination attempt that wounded President Trump and two rally attendees in Butler and tragically took the life of Corey Comperatore.

(57:54)
The Secret Service has a zero-fail mission. July 13th was the closest that a would be assassin has come to killing a current or former president since 1981. President-elect Trump escaped death by millimeters. As this task force has discovered in the course of its thorough investigation, critical errors in the planning and the operations for the July 13th rally allowed a lone gunman to open fire at President Trump and rally attendees. These security failures reveal the need for significant reform at both the tactical and agency-wide level, to correct these vulnerabilities and enhance the Secret Service's ability to carry out its protective mission.

(58:33)
I do want to thank the Acting Director. Right after the first attempt at Butler, I think that next Monday, the Committee on Homeland Security was standing on the site. And at that point, the then Director had never even been to the site. I'm not sure she ever got to the site before resigning, but within a day of what happened in Florida, you were there. So I appreciate the delta in leadership there.

(59:04)
We appreciate the hard work and bravery of the men and women in the Secret Service who have served tirelessly during a busy election season. And it is our hope that this investigation leads to a Secret Service that is stronger and better prepared for its mission. Obviously the biggest failure you brought it up was the AGR building, the failure to the line of sight issues that were related to that. What specific to that failure, the miss of that risk. I mean that a basic training private and infantry would know about 360 degree security. What specifically have you done to make sure that never happens again?

Ronald L. Rowe Jr. (59:42):

Yes, sir. So one, with this paradigm shift, going with the threat model and looking at the fact that we have to be able to provide the highest levels of protection to any of our protectees based on that threat. That means that we bring the full resources of what the Secret Service has, our special operations division operators, which consists of our counter snipers, our counter assault team members and other entities within the SOD. By shifting this paradigm to making sure that those assets are available. So that when site agents are out there, they actually can, they don't have this, "Well, I'll never request this because it's not going to get approved." No, actually what I'm telling you, if you have a vulnerability that you've identified, make the request. Because we are gearing up now to put everything we have to keep all of our protectees safe because we have to be based on mitigating a threat.

Mark Green (01:00:41):

It seems almost to me like it was lackadaisical. I mean, it's hard to fathom that someone would say, we don't need to cover this. And the communications issues with the local law enforcement, I asked the question when they came before the committee recently. When everybody showed up on the day, was there a check-in? And there were law enforcement agencies that had never even talked to Secret Service that day. I mean, these are really basic things. And you would think they would know to do those kinds of things. So it speaks of a apathy or complacency that is really unacceptable in an organization like the Secret Service. One of my questions to you is the level of the failure, it seems unfathomable. The internal policies that weren't adhered to, the failure to mitigate very obvious risks. It speaks to a culture that in a lack of attention to detail, lack of sense of urgency, complacency, I mean these are leadership, these are command climate issues. What is the command climate of the Secret Service? That's the thing that concerns

Mark Green (01:02:00):

… burns me the most. When I reported to the one-sixtieth Special Operations Aviation Regiment commander to be their doctor, at that point in my life, I was 38 years old. I had graduated from West Point Ranger School, commanded in the 82nd Airborne Division and infantry company. I had a master's in systems information. I had a medical degree, top of my med school class, and I wondered if I was good enough to be on that team.

(01:02:27)
That's what I'm talking about, elite culture where everybody comes to work every friggin' day saying, I will do everything I can to make sure I don't fail. And I'll tell you, going to war, I didn't give a shit if I died. What I didn't want to do was fail.

(01:02:45)
But your guys showed up that day and didn't give a shit. There was apathy and complacency, period. And that's your mission now. I appreciate all the systems and the technology that everybody else has asked about, but this is a leadership issue. This is a command climate issue, a culture issue.

(01:03:07)
Can you make a few comments about what you're doing to fix the command climate at the Secret Service?

Ronald L. Rowe Jr. (01:03:14):

Yes sir. So we are reorganizing and reimagining this organization that includes making sure that we are developing a leadership development program so that we are touching people at the GS13 level, which is right before the equivalent of a captain touching them before they get promotion to 14. And we are going to do that. And I just met with the Naval Postgraduate School yesterday. I graduated from the Executive Leaders program at Monterey. I think it's a worthy program. We need to hit people and identify leaders earlier on besides just saying, "Well, they've been here for 18 years, let's make them a GS-15." That's what we have to get to.

Mark Green (01:04:00):

Good, I yield.

Mike Kelly (01:04:02):

Thank you Chairman. I'm going to recognize Representative Houlahan from Pennsylvania for five minutes.

Chrissy Houlahan (01:04:07):

Thank you. Chairman, thank you very much for your leadership as well, a ranking member Crow and to all of the staff members who did all of the work that has produced this really important set of recommendations and findings. I thank you as well. Thank you acting director Rowe too for the conversation today.

(01:04:24)
I have two lines of questions and I am frankly going to focus on some of the technology that I think is essential for us to be able to make sure this kind of thing doesn't happen again. For roughly 11 minutes on July 13th, Mr. Crooks was able to fly a drone near the site of the Butler Rally, the Secret Service equipment, as we all know now, that could have tracked it perhaps back to its origin wasn't functioning at the time of the flight. And you have testified in the US Senate hearing that had the US service service counter drone equipment been working properly, quote, "You may have possibly been able to stop Crooks."

(01:05:01)
We've also learned that requests from the agent responsible for the counter drone equipment for increased countering unmanned aerial systems capabilities and earlier access were denied as well. So several times today, and actually in your opening remarks, you talked a little bit about the different ways that state and local and you all work together in making sure that these locations are secured and your protectees are protected.

(01:05:27)
But right now, state and local law enforcement don't have the legal authority to operate counter drone equipment to advance detection or mitigation. And actually, interestingly in your opening remarks, you made a reference to the fact that you felt as though that might be something that they should have the ability to do.

(01:05:44)
Would it have been useful if state and local law enforcement had additional capabilities and legal authorities to be able to conduct counter drone detection and mitigation to support the Secret Service, sir?

Ronald L. Rowe Jr. (01:05:54):

I do. With proper coordination with FAA.

Chrissy Houlahan (01:05:58):

Thank you. That's my first question. And there is several ideas in this Congress that are bouncing around to be able to give you those authorities. And I would love it if I could ask for your support in helping make sure that that happens.

(01:06:10)
My next set of questions has to do with some of the testimony that we had in our first hearing where unlike some folks here, my background is in engineering and I focus a lot on emerging threats, cyber security, biotechnology and bio threats. And I'm struck by the fact that we're kind of always trying to solve for the last problem that we had. And the last problem that we had was a sniper on a rooftop. And obviously things are evolving, threats are evolving, and your work needs to evolve alongside it.

(01:06:43)
Representative Joyce talked a little bit about the appropriations process and you talked a little bit about the Office of Protective Research that sounds like is now defunct. What kinds of things are you doing and what kinds of things can Congress be doing to help you stay abreast of those kinds of emerging threats to make sure that you can coordinate with DOD and with DARPA and those kinds of things so we're not constantly reinventing the wheel on this? What can we be doing to help and what are you doing as well?

Ronald L. Rowe Jr. (01:07:14):

So, definitely, and again, obviously the color of money. O&S money is fantastic, but PC&I money to be able to go out and acquire things is critical for us. It's critical for the Secret Service. We've certainly had challenges with getting enough PC&I money through the years, that's a separate conversation.

(01:07:38)
But being able to have an applied research element within the Secret Service now is going to be able to have us regularly now go out and interface with all these other entities, the private sector, Silicon Valley, others that are doing innovative things that can be helpful to us because it's not just about physical protection, it's cyber protection as well.

Chrissy Houlahan (01:08:03):

Absolutely. And to the degree that we can continue to be helpful with that and helping you with the color of money and making sure that you have those resources, please do let us know. And also I think one of the things that I was struck by when we were investigating, trying to understand what had happened is we were able to see kind of a creation of what the drone, his drone saw, and what the sight lines and things were. And I was struck by the fact that this was kind of the first time that we thought about those kinds of things that least on this side of the world. And I'm certain that there are a lot of technologies and ideas that are maybe on DOD side or other places where you all can benefit from these, and FBI as well can benefit from the kind of work that DOD is already doing.

(01:08:45)
With the last couple seconds that I have training for the guy who didn't know how to fix the drone, what are we doing to make sure that that doesn't happen again?

Ronald L. Rowe Jr. (01:08:55):

So we've actually established an airspace and aviation section. So now they are the folks that go out and are primarily responsible for all of the counter UAS and all of the enabling UAS. And so now that we have a direct hiring authority, we have this ability. Now thanks to OPM, they were very cooperative. We can go out and hire drone operators. You can fly them remotely from Washington if you need to. My goal is to get more drone operators and people with this expertise downrange in the field so that they can go out and do this and are there on the ground. And that's going to help us fly drones and identify line-of-sight vulnerabilities, get that eye-in-the-sky perspective as we're doing our advance.

Chrissy Houlahan (01:09:38):

Thank you. I yield back. I appreciate your time.

Mike Kelly (01:09:41):

Thank you Ms. Houlahan. Now recognize Representative Lee from Florida for five minutes.

Laurel Lee (01:09:46):

Thank you Mr. Chairman and thank you Director Rowe for being here with us today.

(01:09:51)
As is evident by today's hearing and will also be evident in the forthcoming report. This committee has successfully been able to develop a detailed overview of the facts and circumstances surrounding the days of these two assassination attempts, and we'll be able to provide some specific suggestions and transparency about those events going forward.

(01:10:14)
The Secret Service has been cooperative with this committee and we appreciate your efforts to ensure that we had information that was necessary to make this process meaningful. And we've received a lot of information from you that help inform what is needed with respect to resources, technology, and training.

(01:10:36)
But I would like to discuss with you another aspect of protective work that I believe is also critical to the success of our mission here today.

(01:10:48)
You testified earlier that part of successful protective work also includes being aware of and considering the actual threat environment. So would it be correct to say that when you all are engaged in protective work, one of the things that you do is go to the actual site, assess the physical location and make an assessment of the specific geography and needs associated with securing any specific event site?

Ronald L. Rowe Jr. (01:11:18):

Yes.

Laurel Lee (01:11:19):

Is it also correct to say that part of preparing for these types of events is to analyze the actual threat information that you have, whether it is a specific active threat going on, a greater threat landscape, that you also consider the types of threats and the threat environment that is active at the time of an event you're trying to secure?

Ronald L. Rowe Jr. (01:11:44):

Yes.

Laurel Lee (01:11:45):

So would you agree that you're fighting a big diversity of threats? You mentioned earlier things such as a lone wolf actor, a nation state actor, that they're an incredible diversity of threat actors that you are trying to fight against.

Ronald L. Rowe Jr. (01:12:01):

Yes.

Laurel Lee (01:12:02):

And so for us as Congress with our mission here, which is to understand what has happened and what you need, how we can equip the United States Secret Service to effectively perform their mission, would you also agree that it would be useful or constructive for us to have access to that type of information as we go forward and attempt to finalize our assessment of the going forward future needs of the United States Secret Service?

Ronald L. Rowe Jr. (01:12:30):

Yes.

Laurel Lee (01:12:31):

And here I would like to say this, I noted earlier that the Secret Service has been responsive with us and has provided us with a great deal of information and insight about your operations, what you did in preparation for these two days and what went wrong. But it is important to note information that this committee does not have from the Department of Justice, including components of the Department of Justice, the FBI and ATF, and what we do not have from those agencies to include digital analysis of electronic devices belonging to Crooks. The same for electronic devices belonging to Routh interview summaries for the family members of Crooks who were interviewed by the FBI after this event, any sort of overall financial analysis of these two individuals and who they were and what they were doing.

(01:13:29)
So while we have an extensive and thorough analysis of the logistics, the specific things that happened on that day, who was standing where, who wasn't on a radio, how we could improve the implementation of the security measures that were in place that day.

(01:13:49)
In a very real sense, we do not have some of the critical intelligence information that might have helped us even better understand the needs of your agency going forward.

(01:14:00)
Our mission on this task force is to understand what went wrong on the day of the attempted assassination, ensure accountability and prevent such a failure from ever happening again. And I would assert that preventing such a failure from ever happening again necessitates that this Congress has access to all of the relevant information related to these days related to the actual threat landscape that affects not only President Trump, but other protectees that are under your care.

(01:14:35)
So I beseech and suggest to the Department of Justice going forward that this is information that can and should and must be provided to Congress if we are to understand how to equip and support our federal law enforcement agencies. And with that, Mr. Chairman, I yield back.

Mike Kelly (01:14:58):

Thank you. Thank you. You're spot on Ms. Lee. Now I want to recognize Representative Ivey from Maryland for five minutes. Mr. Ivey.

Glen Ivey (01:15:09):

Thank you Mr. Chairman. And thank you to the ranking member and my colleagues for such bipartisan work here. And thank you to the staff as well. Thank you to you Mr. Rowe. I appreciate what you've been doing and how you've been cooperating with us and the work that you've done at the Secret Service as well.

(01:15:28)
I did want to follow up on Representative Houlihan's questions about drones. I do appreciate the fact that you've addressed many of the issues with respect to the failures that occurred on that day, but I do want to be mindful of making sure we're not just fighting the last battle and we're looking ahead to the future as Ms. Houlihan suggested as well.

(01:15:52)
And I don't know that I want you to answer what I'm about to ask you, at least not in open session. But on October 7th, Hamas used drones to attack, actually to launch its attack against Israel.

(01:16:07)
The drones appeared to me and based on what I've seen in videos to be relatively unsophisticated, relatively inexpensive, but very effective in carrying out that mission so that Hamas could breach Israel's front line and commit the attack that occurred later that day.

(01:16:25)
And we've also seen what's happened with Russia and Ukraine with respect to the use of drones too. And frankly, we were seeing this before July 13th pretty extensively I think.

(01:16:36)
So one of the things I want to ask use of drones for that day, I know we've talked about the visibility piece I think was your word, reconnaissance and the like, but I want to hear from you, maybe not in public, but maybe an executive session about the countermeasures that are available to the Secret Service to deal with drones that are used to actually conduct the attack. So not just sending information back, but as we saw on October 7th could actually carry, for example, an explosive device that could be used on that day.

(01:17:13)
Now I know Chairman Green with Homeland Security, you've heard the passion he brings to this and the background that he has and he's right. We did have a hearing on this at Homeland Security, not just that issue. And I know this task force dissolves I think at the end of next week, but I'm hoping that we'll carry forward with this issue, and there are others too I want to ask you quickly about. The radio communications piece because I know that wasn't, at least some of it wasn't recorded, which surprised me as a local prosecutor, federal prosecutor, the police recorded almost all of their radio communications just as a matter of course, and that was useful to us from a couple of standpoints. One was for prosecution of cases, we'd have actual live time recordings that we could use that we could present to a jury that confirmed the testimony that may have been provided to the jury at that time.

(01:18:11)
But also from a management standpoint, you can go back and listen and that's one of the first things I asked when we got this, the information was, "Where are the radio communications?" I want to hear what happened that day. Now we had to settle for the email communications and the like, text messaging, the sort of things people did on an ad hoc basis to deal with the emergency in a quick way. I thought that was insufficient. And that seems to me that you should be recording these just as a matter of course for the reasons I stated. Body cams is another one to think about. I would say I know that can be expensive in a way that radio communications are not, but also extremely valuable in the prosecution of the cases you've got. There's nothing to prosecute with respect to July. But there is with respect to Mar-a-Lago, and I don't know what the evidence there is, but that's the type of information that could be useful.

(01:19:10)
And then with my last minute, I wanted to pick up on what Representative Lee raised a moment ago. This isn't really to you actually. This is to my former colleagues at the Department of Justice.

(01:19:22)
I recognize that in ongoing criminal investigations, there's a reluctance to turn over information too soon because it can undermine the investigation. You can tip off defendants and targets and the like so you want to be careful about that and I understand that. But I must say too that there's some information that we didn't get and she outlined some of that that didn't seem to be connected to an ongoing criminal investigation. And I thought that we should have had access to that. And I'll note this as well. I've done some previous investigations, the Whitewater hearings for example, when I was a staffer many years ago where we were able to communicate with the independent counsel on an ongoing basis.

(01:20:05)
And we did that in the wake of the Iran-Contra disaster where they immunized Ollie North, compelled him to testify. Department of Justice then had ended up having to dismiss the case. It was thrown out of court because of the information sharing that took place. But even in the wake of that, Congress was able to work with the independent council and it can with the Department of Justice in making sure that we get the information that we need to handle these kinds of situations. Because this is about as serious as it gets from the standpoint of what we're tasked to do. This is extremely important work. We would need to make sure that our elections are controlled by ballots and not bullets. And this was relevant here.

(01:20:47)
But thank you for what you've done and the work you've continued to do, the direction you're taking the Secret Service in, Mr. Chairman, thank you for allowing me to run over and I thank all of you, all my colleagues here and the staff again for the outstanding bipartisan work that you've been able to do.

Mike Kelly (01:21:03):

Thank you, Mr. Ivey. Now we'd recognize Mr. Fallon from Texas.

Pat Fallon (01:21:06):

Thank you Mr. Chairman and thank you for the work that you and Ranking Member Rowe and the rest of the committee has done and certainly our staff.

(01:21:12)
Mr. Rowe, would you agree that the protection that President Trump was provided on the 13th of July was wholly and tragically negligent? That site plan was abysmal to the point of derelict. And on the 13th of July in Butler, Pennsylvania, United States Secret Service not only failed President Trump, but Corey Comperatore and the American people in historic fashion.

Ronald L. Rowe Jr. (01:21:35):

I would.

Pat Fallon (01:21:37):

In the months leading up to July 13th, who was the director of the Secret Service?

Ronald L. Rowe Jr. (01:21:42):

Kimberly Cheadle.

Pat Fallon (01:21:43):

Okay. Other than former director Cheadle, who was the most senior Secret Service agent?

Ronald L. Rowe Jr. (01:21:50):

In the agency?

Pat Fallon (01:21:51):

Mm-hmm.

Ronald L. Rowe Jr. (01:21:51):

That would be me. I was the Deputy Director.

Pat Fallon (01:21:53):

In the months leading up to July of 24, were you made aware of highly credible intelligence that a serious and grave threat to President Trump's life from an adversarial nation state. There was a very serious threat?

Ronald L. Rowe Jr. (01:22:09):

In this open setting. Congressman, I can't discuss what I was or was not aware of.

Pat Fallon (01:22:16):

Former Director Cheadle said she was aware. So I would imagine, by extension, that you were aware.

Ronald L. Rowe Jr. (01:22:21):

I would… Then I would point-

Pat Fallon (01:22:22):

She said in open session that-

Ronald L. Rowe Jr. (01:22:23):

… I would point to Director Cheadle's-

Pat Fallon (01:22:25):

All right, so you were aware. So we have a unique circumstance here because we had a former President of the United States who is the leading candidate at that time to be the next President of the United States, and he will be now that we know. And he was being threatened by a foreign nefarious nation state because of actions he took while he was President of the United States. Very unique circumstances.

(01:22:44)
So being that you were of these unique circumstances, did President Trump, was he provided a security detail akin to what a sitting president would receive?

Ronald L. Rowe Jr. (01:22:55):

At that time? At that time he was not. He was not.

Pat Fallon (01:23:00):

Would you agree that if there was a counter surveillance unit there in Butler on the 13th, he would've been safer?

Ronald L. Rowe Jr. (01:23:06):

I think if there was a counter surveillance unit advanced that was on the ground, it could have aided the advanced team in identifying the AGR.

Pat Fallon (01:23:14):

So he would've been safer?

Ronald L. Rowe Jr. (01:23:16):

President Trump would've been safer.

Pat Fallon (01:23:17):

Yeah. Okay. I don't think this would've even occurred, but be that as it may, did the president's detail request a CSU to your knowledge?

Ronald L. Rowe Jr. (01:23:27):

I'm not aware of a request for CSU.

Pat Fallon (01:23:29):

Now, was the threat from the nefarious nation state disseminated to agents in the field and in the protective details?

Ronald L. Rowe Jr. (01:23:39):

I'm just pausing Congressman because I'm trying to walk our tightrope here in an open setting. What I can tell you is that the Secret Service provided assets on that day for a particular-

Pat Fallon (01:23:53):

What I can tell you, sir, is that the folks that are whistle-blowing and informing some members of Congress say that they were not aware of this threat. And that's what I'm getting at with being proactive and showing leadership is we know for a fact that there was no CSU in Butler.

(01:24:07)
Was there a full CAT team there?

Ronald L. Rowe Jr. (01:24:09):

There was not no.

Pat Fallon (01:24:11):

A full CAT team is six members and there were two there. So you knew the threat. You didn't disseminate to the field and the protective details. You didn't… President Trump didn't have a protection that was akin to a sitting president. He didn't have the CSU, he had only the third of the CAT team. So that's that kind of ineptitude and inaction and complacency and neglect that really, quite frankly, is as telling is it is chilling. And had it not been for a very blessed fortuitous and a happenstance of a perfectly timed turn of the head, President Trump would've lost his life that day.

(01:24:43)
Now only, this is another thing that concerns me. We report to our constituents. And instead of really after this happened, did you go, the next day to Butler, Pennsylvania on the 14th of July?

Ronald L. Rowe Jr. (01:25:01):

I did not.

Pat Fallon (01:25:01):

Okay. Did you go that week?

Ronald L. Rowe Jr. (01:25:04):

I did not.

Pat Fallon (01:25:05):

Okay. The FBI held that site secure for five days as an active crime scene and they released it back to the owners on the 18th and you did not visit. And when did you finally visit the site?

Ronald L. Rowe Jr. (01:25:16):

I visited about a day after I was appointed.

Pat Fallon (01:25:19):

So July 24th, Cheadle came in July 22nd. She got skewered and roasted by the Democrats and Republicans on the Oversight Committee, of which I sit on. She resigned the next day and then only that day did you go?

Ronald L. Rowe Jr. (01:25:31):

I'll take your word for it, Congressman.

Pat Fallon (01:25:32):

Why'd you wait nine days, 11 days?

Ronald L. Rowe Jr. (01:25:36):

Why did I wait nine days?

Pat Fallon (01:25:37):

Yes. Director of the FBI went to the site. Why didn't you go?

Ronald L. Rowe Jr. (01:25:41):

Congressman? I think I was appointed July 23rd and I was there on the 24th or 25th.

Pat Fallon (01:25:46):

But you were the second most senior member of the Secret Service. You could have gone.

Ronald L. Rowe Jr. (01:25:50):

And I was managing from here, the crisis we actually did-

Pat Fallon (01:25:55):

So you didn't act on it. Got it. Did you call the … You were managing the crisis you just said, did you call the detail that night on July 13th that was protecting President Trump?

Ronald L. Rowe Jr. (01:26:03):

On that night they were operational, sir.

Pat Fallon (01:26:06):

You did not. Okay. Did you call them the next day?

Ronald L. Rowe Jr. (01:26:08):

No, I did not.

Pat Fallon (01:26:09):

Okay. When did you finally talk to them?

Ronald L. Rowe Jr. (01:26:11):

I spoke to them when they arrived in Milwaukee.

Pat Fallon (01:26:14):

So four days later, July 17th. Does that sound about right?

Ronald L. Rowe Jr. (01:26:18):

Yes sir.

Pat Fallon (01:26:19):

Okay. So you waited four days and when we were talking earlier, a couple months ago, this is an epic failure. We all agree on that. And instead of really focusing on the egregious errors and correcting the incompetence and improving the doctrine and changing the culture, there was a massive appropriations request.

(01:26:37)
We know that you have 8,000 employees. We know that they have a 3.1 billion dollar budget and you asked for 2 billion in additional dollars. What sticks in our craw is when we report to our constituents, we have to say, "Hey, this federal agency failed epically and then they wanted to almost double their budget."

(01:26:51)
How much would it have cost to put somebody on that water tower? How much would it have cost to had drones that were actually functioning that day? How much would it have cost to have an ether cable to where your anti-drone technology would've worked? How much would it have cost in a walkthrough with local law enforcement to secure the AGR site or put cameras on that roof or put agents on that roof or have your snipers have iPads or have one command post instead of two or cordon off the damn AGR complex, 17 acres, that would've cost $2 billion. And in fact, with caution tape, signs, posts and stakes, it would've run about 410 bucks because we ran through it. Let's add another zero. Say it's four grand. It's not 2 billion.

(01:27:34)
So I got another question for you. Do you recognize this photo?

Ronald L. Rowe Jr. (01:27:45):

Yes sir, I do.

Pat Fallon (01:27:46):

Okay. Was that the remembrance of September 11th?

Ronald L. Rowe Jr. (01:27:50):

It was.

Pat Fallon (01:27:50):

Was it in New York?

Ronald L. Rowe Jr. (01:27:52):

It was at ground zero.

Pat Fallon (01:27:53):

Okay. Who is usually at an event like this closest to the President of the United States, security wise?

Ronald L. Rowe Jr. (01:28:02):

The SAC of the detail.

Pat Fallon (01:28:05):

Special Agent in Charge of the detail. Were you the special agent in charge of the detail that day?

Ronald L. Rowe Jr. (01:28:10):

Actually let me address this. Could you please, staff leave that, oh no leave that one up with the circle around me. Thank you.

(01:28:17)
So actually Congressman, what you're not seeing is the SAC of the detail off, out of the picture's view. And that is the day where we remember the more than 3000 people that have died on 911. I actually responded to ground zero. I was there going through the ashes at the World Trade Center. I was there at Fresh Kills.

Pat Fallon (01:28:39):

I'm not asking you that. I'm asking you if you the special agent in charge-

Ronald L. Rowe Jr. (01:28:44):

[inaudible 01:28:44] to show respect-

Pat Fallon (01:28:44):

You were not.

Ronald L. Rowe Jr. (01:28:45):

… for a Secret Service brother that died on 911.

Pat Fallon (01:28:49):

… all that you were trying to be.

Ronald L. Rowe Jr. (01:28:50):

Do not invoke 911 for political purposes.

Pat Fallon (01:28:53):

Oh, that I'm not. I'm invoking this.

Ronald L. Rowe Jr. (01:28:54):

You are, sir.

Mike Kelly (01:28:56):

You are out of line. Gentlemen, gentlemen-

Pat Fallon (01:28:57):

I would like to ask him a question-

Mike Kelly (01:28:58):

Please, you are out of order.

Pat Fallon (01:29:00):

Don't try to bully me-

Mike Kelly (01:29:02):

Order.

Pat Fallon (01:29:03):

… I'm an elected member of Congress and I'm asking you a serious question and you are playing politics.

Ronald L. Rowe Jr. (01:29:06):

I am public servant who has served this nation and-

Pat Fallon (01:29:10):

You won't answer the question.

Ronald L. Rowe Jr. (01:29:11):

On our day, on our country's darkest day.

Mike Kelly (01:29:13):

The committee will come to order.

Pat Fallon (01:29:17):

I'm asking you serious questions for the American people in they're very simple, they're not true questions. Were you the special agent in charge that day?

Ronald L. Rowe Jr. (01:29:23):

No, I wasn't. I was there representing the United States Secret Service, sir. My time-

Mike Kelly (01:29:27):

Mr. Fallon your time's expired.

Ronald L. Rowe Jr. (01:29:27):

… did not affect protective operative.

Pat Fallon (01:29:27):

You know why you were there?

Mike Kelly (01:29:27):

Your time's expired.

Pat Fallon (01:29:27):

Because you wanted to be visible because you were visiting for the-

Ronald L. Rowe Jr. (01:29:27):

I was there to pay respect for fallen member of this agency.

Mike Kelly (01:29:27):

You are out of line Congressman.

Pat Fallon (01:29:27):

Vice President [inaudible 01:29:27] his life because you put those agents out of position.

Ronald L. Rowe Jr. (01:29:27):

Mr. Chairman-

Pat Fallon (01:29:27):

Did you have a radio with you?

Mike Kelly (01:29:27):

Mr. Fallon your time has expired.

Ronald L. Rowe Jr. (01:29:31):

I did sir. And you are out of line.

Glen Ivey (01:29:50):

Mr. Chairman, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Chairman.

Mike Kelly (01:29:53):

Yes, sir.

Glen Ivey (01:29:54):

Please.

Mike Kelly (01:29:55):

All right, and we are back in order now. We're back in order now.

Glen Ivey (01:29:59):

Thank you.

Mike Kelly (01:30:01):

Mr. Moskowitz, you are now recognized for five minutes.

Jared Moskowitz (01:30:06):

Okay.

Ronald L. Rowe Jr. (01:30:07):

Congressman.

Jared Moskowitz (01:30:09):

How you doing?

Ronald L. Rowe Jr. (01:30:10):

Good sir.

Jared Moskowitz (01:30:10):

All right, so, look the reason emotions are high is because we almost did have a former president and now the president-elect literally almost killed live on television. And there were two pieces of luck that day. One, bad one, good.

(01:30:32)
The Secret Service's luck ran out that day because the systemic failures didn't start on July 13th. They were probably occurring, and the luck ran out that day. But luckily, President Trump moved his head and he wasn't killed. I can't imagine where we would be if we didn't have that second piece of luck.

(01:30:54)
And so everyone here brings their different experience. I'm a former emergency management director. I know disasters when I see them, right? And July 13th was an absolute disaster. There's just no question about that. And I've done after action reviews and you go through the things and your response to a hurricane and what failed and then you're like a general fighting the last war.

(01:31:17)
We're going to fix the things that failed that day. But really you got to do more of a holistic approach, not just look at the things that failed that day, the things that aren't working in general, bigger picture and not just fix just those specific things.

(01:31:30)
I also am familiar about what it's like to come into an agency and clean up someone else's mess, which is what you're doing, quite frankly, and so I applaud you for that. You've been handed a ship with a hole in it and it's taken on water and you got to figure out how to A, fix the hole and get the water out of the boat at the same time. I applaud you for stepping up and doing that.

(01:31:57)
I want to talk about one of the comments that multiple people made on this committee, and it's for your agency and it's for other agencies, which is that a lot of time we get stuck in this process thing.

(01:32:09)
Oh, because of process, we can't communicate with the public or we're not going to communicate with Congress because of process. Agencies need to change with the times. Things are different now. And when you guys don't put out information, that vacuum gets filled with conspiracy theories.

(01:32:26)
We talk about restoring faith in the institutions. Yes, government needs to work and people need to see that they're competent, but at the same time, we're not going to be able to restore that faith if the agencies aren't communicating with the public and instead are getting conspiracy theories online because no one else is giving them information. And that's going to be a push-pull that you, DOJ, the FBI, are going to have to deal with in today's world of communications. Other people will tell your story for you and it will be false if you don't tell it.

Jared Moskowitz (01:33:01):

I want to talk about two specific things, and then I want to get to Page 7 of the report, which for me is the most important. The 9/11 Commission recommended fixing the comms issue by creating a network. AT&T FirstNet, I think Verizon has one as well. We knew about the comm failures that day, the throttling the radios, people on different systems; and yet, 20 years, 25 years later, your agency is still struggling with the same problems we had on 9/11, officers using their own personal cell phones, not on the network that was made for emergency personnel, which would have worked that day.

(01:33:44)
Procurement. I want to talk about procurement because it's something that most people don't think about, and it's not sexy. And I did tons of procurement when I was the emergency management director. One of the reasons why we have this problem, and it's not just at the federal level, I saw it at the shooting in Marjory Stoneman Douglas at my high school between the city police versus the county, the sheriff's office, is everyone's doing their own procurement. Every city, every county, every state, every federal agency, every sector is doing different procurement, and you're all hiring different companies with different systems and no one talks to each other, computer systems, radio systems, whatever it is. And we're not going to fix this problem until we figure out how to do more of a comprehensive procurement for multiple agencies to get them on the same systems. And so that's a system piece, but I'm telling you, we're not going to fix this problem until that happens.

(01:34:38)
But I want to talk about Page 7 of the report. There's a line in there, and I'm not going to ask you to comment because I know what the answer will be. I've been through this. Page 7 of the report says, "Congress must consider whether the Secret Service investigative obligations can effectively coexist with its primary protective mission and whether the agency's investigative functions should remain within the Department of Homeland Security." Yahtzee. And I will tell you that Homeland Security was the right to create it. Senator Lieberman was right. It has a core function. It should exist. We need to foster communication between our agencies. But I would surmise that the Department of Homeland Security has become too big. It can't function. It's 22 agencies, and it's just gigantic. And every director, administrator of FEMA that I've talked to when they were in the agency wouldn't tell me that. But as soon as they left, they would say, "We can't make the changes that we know we need to make within FEMA because we can't get it done within Homeland."

(01:35:44)
And so I'm going to be filing a bill the first day of next Congress to remove FEMA and Secret Service from Homeland Security and make them direct reports to the White House. I think the changes you want to make, I think you'll be able to make them quicker if you're not within Homeland. And so if we really want to talk about having our agencies respond faster, having our agencies fix these problems that didn't just exist on July 3rd, probably existed a year ago, two years ago, three years ago, five years ago, we have to be serious about breaking up Homeland Security. We have to realize that a 22 agency department cannot function efficiently. So it's quite frankly the reason why I joined the DOGE Committee, to some people's misconception. I joined it with a specific focus on trying to fix Homeland because that's where this conversation is going to happen. Right?

(01:36:37)
And so while we look at the report, I would tell you not to overlook Page 7. Everything we've talked about, about technology, everything we talked about, everything Representative Greene talked about culture… You actually had a funny line. You said you want to put the secret back in Secret Service. I think Representative Greene was making sure you don't forget about the service piece also, right? But I think you got to get outside of Homeland. I do. And I'm not going to ask you to comment on that because, trust me, I've had 100 conversations, and when they're in public, they're very different than when they are in private. Everyone knows. Everyone knows that Homeland is not working in its current condition. But you know what happens? Everyone wants to protect their sacred cow. Staff on the Homeland Security Committee, they won't let it happen. Homeland doesn't want to let it happen because they'll want more. 22, they'll take 30, right? It's just the way it's working.

(01:37:33)
Mr. Chairman, I want to thank your leadership running the committee. I want to thank Ranking Member Crow. I think the report is very important. I think we've done it on a bipartisan basis, but I really want to hit this point home. If we are serious about making these changes, and we got to get serious about we have an agency that is not functioning in Homeland because it's just too big. Thank you. I yield back.

Mike Kelly (01:38:01):

Thank you, sir. Before we close, I want to turn to Ranking Member Crow for a brief closing remarks.

Jason Crow (01:38:09):

Thank you, Chairman. And thank you to the members for this hearing. This was an overwhelmingly bipartisan, productive hearing. The questions from the members we're serious and robust, and clearly they took their charge to learn the issues and to dive into the investigation very seriously.

(01:38:29)
And I also want to thank you, Acting Director Rowe. I've been in Congress now almost six years, and I've been in plenty of situations where there are directors and department heads and acting directors and department heads who are in crisis situations or contingency situations where there's a crisis within their agency or something that has gone wrong. This is an oversight hearing, so more often than not, there's something that has gone wrong, and there's people that deal with that in a variety of different ways. But in my experience, and I don't want to speak for the Chairman, and he'll have a chance to speak about this, but we've talked a lot about this, and you've been very candid. You've been very open. You have accepted responsibility for the things that we feel like the Service has had to accept responsibility for. You, obviously, were not the director on July 13th. The deputy director of agencies has different responsibilities. Usually, personnel management is what deputy directors do. Then you stepped into the role and have, I think, done a very good job of remediating, mitigating, and providing a path and vision forward, so I thank you for that and your continued service.

(01:39:40)
And I also want to make really clear, when we're talking about the Secret Service, like any of these organizations, they are broad, diverse organizations of thousands of people. And there's no doubt that there were security failures on July 13th and things didn't go right. But I also want to be very careful not to paint everybody with a broad brush. There are people that did not do their jobs, and there needs to be accountability for that. But there's also no doubt in my mind that there were many people who did do their jobs, that showed up with the right mentality, the seriousness, the commitment, who would've jumped up and took that bullet. In fact, after the shooting, did go on the stage and do what they needed to do and were willing to risk their lives, and I want to thank them.

(01:40:24)
I think it's really important that we draw that to distinction here because I know a lot of those officers and agents are listening here today. And for those folks that show up every day with that commitment to excellence, who are willing to put their lives on the line, that we see them, too, and we appreciate their service and what they do. We don't want to put your agency in a position where this is a negative detractor for morale. It makes it harder for you to right the ship. So that distinction is very important in that regard.

(01:40:58)
I also hope America saw that we did come together in a bipartisan way and fulfill our mandate of looking at these two attempted assassination attempts. We took it seriously. You couldn't watch this hearing today and actually see who was a Democrat and Republican. If you took our name placards down here, Americans wouldn't be able to tell who was. This was issue-focused. This was focused on our mandate, and I think that's really telling, and I would encourage folks to watch this if they haven't watched the entirety of the hearing and look at how we conducted our business here.

(01:41:43)
The other thing I want to do is just thank the staff. This was a heavy lift. Five months, the number of transcribed interviews, document requests was really substantial at a time, as the chairman said, many of us were out on the campaign trail and inaccessible and spread throughout the country. Honestly, it's the staff that did the heavy lifting here, both the Republican and the Democratic staff. They have taken time away from their families. They have taken time away from their jobs. They have left law practices and other lucrative jobs to come and do important work for the American people; and I'm grateful for the work of the staff to put us in a position to submit this report and to tell the story that America deserves to have told.

(01:42:39)
So with that, I want to thank you again, acting Director Rowe, for your testimony and your commitment to addressing the issues that have been identified here today. Mr. Chairman, I yield back.

Mike Kelly (01:42:53):

Thank you, Mr. Crow. I want to thank Mr. Rowe for his testimony and for appearing before us today; and I know that at times it can be very emotional because of what took place. I will repeat what I said earlier. I was about 60 feet away when the President, when he put his hand to his head and went down, and as the shots were ringing on, my main concern was, "My gosh, they just shot the president." But I couldn't find my wife. I couldn't find my oldest son, and I couldn't find three of my grandchildren where they were supposed to be. They were not put where they were supposed to be that day. They were left to wander someplace else, which I'll never understand. Look, it's a very emotional thing. We can talk through these things and be very orderly about it, or we can look at what happened that day and say, and I think I got this feeling from the captain, Captain Higgins. When you look at the history of the United States, there are certain things that are always going to stand out. I will just tell you this about my hometown of Butler, Pennsylvania. It was once recognized as the birthplace of the Jeep. It is now recognized as the location where the attempted assassination of Donald Trump took place. So it's overshadowed everything else that that town was ever known for and what they're so proud of and how wounded they were that day. And I will say this again, I've said it before, local law enforcement was the first direction that fingers were pointed, that these local law enforcement guys, gosh, they just didn't do their job. They didn't do their job. I know them personally. I know how deeply wounded they were by that. And I think that we have to understand these are real people doing real things in real time.

(01:44:35)
So when I'm out shopping, people come up to me and say, "You know what happened that day?" I said, "Well, I have a pretty good idea." They said, 'Well, let me tell you my version." And they tell me their version. I said, "That's interesting. So where were you on the grounds that day?" They said, "Well, I actually wasn't there." Now, why do people come up with these conspiracy theories? They come up with conspiracy theories because they don't get answers at the time they're needed. And I think that what we're trying to do, and I got to tell you, this is not a red committee or a blue committee. This is truly a red, white, and blue committee. And I will defy anybody to look at any of the members that are sitting up here today and say, "I've seen this guy before in action. I know who he is. He's on Fox every night, or he is on CNN," whatever the hell people get on. Excuse me. I know we're not supposed to use any language like that. Chairman Greene, I know that it's a very emotional thing for you, too.

(01:45:24)
So it isn't a funny issue, and it's something that does bring out the best of us and the worst in us. So whenever Jason and I first talked, we were, and Ms. Lee mentioned this, we were given three goal. There was three-fold: understand what went wrong on the day of the attempted assassination, ensure accountability, and to prevent such an agency failure from ever happening again. I know when I first talked to Representative Clay, he said, "You can never guarantee that it'll never happen again." And the longer I've worked with him, and I would encourage all of you to, if you can, draw up on your phones, the captain when he's speaking, when he's in Louisiana, you will get the full force of who this man is and what he firmly believes and what his mission in life is. So you can be very animated. I'm amazed at how you operate today because you're very, you stick with it. But I would encourage anybody go to that and please look at it and then tell me, "Wow, this guy's dedicated to that."

(01:46:27)
So look, we are going to adjourn here in a minute, but without objection, members have five days to submit additional materials and written questions for witnesses to the Chair, which will be forwarded to the witness; and we ask the witness to please respond promptly. This has been an interesting time, and I know we're supposed to close, but I think that, because Jason hit on it, the efforts and the time and the dedication that this team has put into this, this is incredible. I'm not talking about members, because as you know, we had an election coming up, but these members never left here. They spent hour after hour after hour, thousands and thousands of pages, written testimony. It is incredible what took place, but you'll never see that because that's not the headline. The headline is, we had a really dedicated group of Patriots who said, "I will step out of my normal life, and for the next four months, I will dedicate myself to getting the answers that the American people need to have from the very first."

(01:47:35)
We are suffering from a lack of confidence, trust, and faith in our government. If we can't do these things and bring it back out and go to the American people, "We know you had questions. We've got you the answers." That was our whole purpose in doing this. And so I look back at it, and again, I'm going to mention this, at the end of that day, my brother lives at the end of the runway, by the way, on those fields. My nine-year-old grandson, Charles, said to me, "Grandpa, why would anybody try to kill President Trump?" I said, "Charles, I can't answer that question." He said, "They must be crazy." This was a nine-year-old. And people ask me, "What was the effect on your grandchildren?" I said, "I got to tell you, as their grandfather, I'm appalled that they ever had to see that. As a member of Congress, it strengthened my resolve that, you know what? We can go beyond this. We can be better than anybody imagined we could be, and we can accept the fact that we failed that day and understand that everybody on this panel had one goal and one goal only, and that was to restore the faith and trust and confidence that the American people need to have in our agency."

(01:48:47)
So I want to note that the task force will hold its business meeting following the conclusion of this hearing, and we will adjourn the hearing and reset the room for the business meeting. We're going to take 15 minutes. So I think it's drifted a little bit beyond. I said 11:50. What? Okay, 11:50, we'll reconvene. Again, I want to thank… Director, thanks for being here. I know this is a difficult position to be in. Thank you.

Speaker 2 (01:49:11):

Thank you, sir.

Mike Kelly (01:49:11):

Without objection, the task force stands adjourned.

Mike Kelly (02:19:05):

A quorum being present the business meeting of the task force on the attempted assassination of Donald J. Trump will come to order. The task force is meeting pursuant to notice to consider its final report and recommendations in pursuant to notice and pursuant to section 2(a) and of H. Res 1367. I call it the final report of the task force on the attempted assassination of Donald J. Trump. The clerk will designate the report.

Speaker 3 (02:19:32):

Final report of findings and recommendations.

Mike Kelly (02:19:36):

I recognize myself for five minutes for a statement.

Speaker 4 (02:19:43):

It starts here.

Mike Kelly (02:19:43):

Now, House Resolution 1367 was adopted in the House of Representatives by a 416 to zero vote on July 24th. The resolution established a task force on the attempted assassination of Donald J. Trump. Section two, clause two of the Resolution directed the task force to issue a final report of its findings to the House not later than December 13th, 2024, including any recommendations for legislative reforms necessary to prevent future security lapses. Today, the task force is meeting to fulfill this charge, and consider the final report of findings and recommendations. The report is the product of an investigation spanning just under five months by the task force.

(02:20:25)
I commend my partner and friend, ranking member Jason Crow, all the members of the task force, the staff of the task force, and all the members who supported this investigation. I also want to thank Speaker Mike Johnson and Minority Leader Hakeem Jeffries for working together to launch and support the needs of this investigation. This support includes the passage of House Resolution 1470 in September, which expanded the mandate of the task force following the second attempt to assassinate President-elected Trump on September 15th in West Palm Beach, Florida. Our work has underscored that there is bipartisan ground for working together to protect our democracy from threats of violence.

(02:21:05)
I'm especially proud of the work the task force has completed to get clear and complete answers about the security failures that occurred in Butler, Pennsylvania on July 13th. This report and the transcripts we will release thoroughly explain the multiple points of failure that occurred that day. It's also a road map for addressing the issues that contributed to and revealed problems inside the world's premier protection entity. The task force received substantial cooperation from the Secret Service as well as state and local entities, which allowed the task force to make clear findings and recommendations about security failures.

(02:21:39)
However, the same cannot be said for all questions about July 13th. Shooter Thomas Crooks' motivations remain largely a mystery despite repeated requests from information from the FBI and the Department of Justice, which never shared information about Crooks' online activity, notes or transcripts of interviews with his family and members of other associates. Limitations on information shared with the task force restricted our investigation from creating a clear picture about who Crooks spent time with, how he spent his hours online or where he traveled in the days and weeks leading up to his assassination attempt.

(02:22:16)
Leaders in the next Congress may wish to continue investigating these and other outstanding questions. One of the topics our bipartisan report covers are areas where we asked for cooperation from federal agencies, and did not receive it. We also include a recommendation to Congress that it should find means to clarify its right to obtain law enforcement sensitive information. I'm really proud of the work the task force has done in a very limited timeframe. As I said earlier, the 13 members of Congress were all running for reelection at the same time. They were going through primaries that were still on the calendar. They were going through a general election, but the people who never walked away from the task was the staff. I think that type of dedication is absolutely, extremely one of the things that the American people look for, "How dedicated are you to the task you were given?" The answer in this case is extremely dedicated, and they did great, great, great work. Now, my constituents in Butler have expressed gratitude for the work of the task force. It was great from a standpoint, not of what it was that we were tasked to doing, but the fact that at a time when it's recognized that you guys can't work together on anything. You guys find faults with everything that you do, and you just don't…

(02:23:33)
This was never political. This was never political, but the task we were given and the task that the force did is off the charts, at the top of everything I've ever done since I've been in Congress. I now want to recognize ranking member Jason Crow.

Jason Crow (02:23:49):

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Just to dovetail on the chairman's comments, this task force is created after the July 13th attempted assassination of President-elect Donald Trump, because America deserved answers. They deserved answers as to how something like this could happen, and how it would be fixed. But they also deserve to know that members of Congress in a bipartisan way could come together and condemn political violence and say there's no place for it in our country. They also needed to know that there are folks here who are willing to roll up their sleeves, and do good work that needs to be done, and fulfill their duties, and put politics aside for the good of the country, and to get answers that everybody, regardless of your political affiliation, deserves to have, and to restore trust and confidence in that process.

(02:24:45)
I am very proud of this final report, because it does all of those things. The process itself actually did those things. The hearing today was a great example of it. It was robust. It was thorough. It was serious. The members came here with the charge to ask tough questions, to get answers, and to tell the story, and that is what happened. I also want to reiterate what the Chairman said about the largely very cooperative posture of the federal government in responding to our requests for interviews, responding to our requests for documents, with the exception of the Department of Justice and the FBI, which did not give us some very critical and important information that we believe the American people still need to know.

(02:25:35)
If their intent was to slow walk us beyond the mandate or the purview of this committee, they are sorely mistaken, because you have members on this task force that sit on committees of jurisdiction that will be coming in next Congress, that will still get that information. America deserves to know what happened with Mr. Crooks, what his motivations were, who else he was talking to. That is an important part of the story. Now, our report is thorough. It's comprehensive. It gives many of the answers that America deserves to know, but they still do need to know those remaining pieces. I commit to work with every member of this task force, even after this task force sunsets in a couple of weeks to ensure that that happens.

(02:26:26)
I want to thank the staff. I said this earlier in the hearing that the product that we are going to be voting on and we'll release is the work largely of the staff that put their lives on hold, that missed important life events and family events, who left different law practices, different positions within government to come and actually do their patriotic duty as Americans, and provide answers to this country and to serve the members. Their dedication, their professionalism, their work ethic is really second to none. So, I want to recognize, once again, the incredible work of the staff, both Republican and Democrat, in doing that incredible work. I want to thank Speaker Mike Johnson and Minority Leader Hakeem Jeffries for actually working bipartisanly to set up this task force.

(02:27:17)
They both told us, me and the chairman, they said how they wanted this to go, that they wanted it to be serious, that that was their intent, and they set that tone themselves at the very outset of this. In fact, the chairman and I, neither the chairman and I were seeking these positions and these appointments, but I'm glad that they partnered me with Chairman Kelly, who was a wonderful partner. It's been one of the best experiences actually in my time in Congress working with the Chairman, working with the other members in a very serious and robust way. This hearing was actually one of the best hearings that I've been a part of in my time in Congress with the seriousness, the professionalism, and the attention to detail that everybody brought to it.

(02:28:02)
So with that, thank you again, and I look forward to the remainder of the business meeting here in releasing this report in due time to the public.

Mike Kelly (02:28:16):

Thank you, Mr. Crow. Do any other members seek recognition? No.

Speaker 4 (02:28:23):

No. So, no. I see none.

Speaker 3 (02:28:27):

Mr. Chairman, I move that the task force favorably report to the House-

Speaker 4 (02:28:31):

Wait. Wait. Wait. Wait. Wait. We got to go to amendments.

Speaker 3 (02:28:34):

Okay.

Mike Kelly (02:28:36):

Okay. All right. Say without objection, the report is considered read and open for amendment.

Speaker 4 (02:28:42):

Does anyone wish to make-

Mike Kelly (02:28:44):

Does anyone wish to make an amendment? None being seen. I now recognize Mr. Crow for a motion.

Speaker 3 (02:28:51):

Mr. Chairman, I move that the task force favorably report to the House the task force's report.

Mike Kelly (02:28:57):

The question is on the motion to favorably report to the House. All those in favor say aye.

Members (02:29:01):

Aye.

Mike Kelly (02:29:03):

All those opposed, no. In the opinion of the chair, the ayes have it.

Speaker 5 (02:29:10):

Mr. Chairman, could the record reflect that it was unanimous vote?

Mike Kelly (02:29:15):

Yes. Yes. It will. The motion to forward the report to the House of Representatives is agreed to. Without objection, the motion to reconsider is laid on the table. Without objection, the staff is authorized to make any technical and conforming corrections, and to include the actions of the meetings today. So without objection, pursuant to House Rule XI, clause 2(1), all members are entitled to submit to the clerk of the task force within two days any supplemental, minority additional or dissenting views.

(02:29:53)
So before closing, before we adjourn the task force, I want to congratulate the members of the bipartisan nature of this task force. It's been a privilege and an honor to work in cooperative and bipartisan manner. I also want to thank all of the members of the staff of the task force. I think Jason's touched on it, and we keep repeating it, but it deserves repeating. The task force did incredible work at a time that was so compressed. They really were dedicated to it. They stepped out of their private lives to come and do this, which is a tremendous patriotic thing to do.

(02:30:22)
I also want to thank the office of the Official Reporters for their quality staff and covering the meetings and many, many interviews and conduct. So, there being no further questions, the task force stands adjourned. Members, I-

Jason Crow (02:30:37):

Thank you.

Speaker 4 (02:30:38):

Please stay for the picture.

Mike Kelly (02:30:39):

Yes, yes, please. We want to have a team picture.

Jason Crow (02:30:42):

Because we all know it-